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Abstract: The transatlantic alliance was strengthened by the experiences.from World 
War Il and the Cold War. 1/1ejifty-year success sto1)1- triggered by the Truman Doc-
trine, the Marshall Plan, and the institutionalization of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization-has, howeve1; recenrly come under scrutiny through eight years of 
Bush-era politics. Europe and the U.S. have faced a difficult task in improving the 
transatlantic alliance, which has led to a weakened alliance in international politics. 
This article identifies five clearly defined contemporaJ)' challenges. The near future 
will show whether the blame for the perceived, eroding transatlantic alliance can 
be put squarely on the shoulders of the Bush administration, or if Europe and the 
U.S. have simply outgrown each other. While Obama's proclaimed faith in a restored 
transatlantic alliance and Europe'.~ positive response to the new Presidency .mggest 
that the Bush era was a tempora1y deviation from the historic path of murually ben-
eficial transatlantic relations, political scie11tis1s disagree on this point and President 
Obama's stance on fo reign policy questions has yet tu e1ystallize. Nonetheless, thefi1-
ture Europe-U.S. relations will likely be based on cooperation rather than on c01~(lict. 
Keywords: Transatlantic relations-President Obama-U.S.foreign policy-the Eu-
ropean Union - securiry 
Introduction 
Barack Obama, the newly elected President of the United States, faces 
expectations of recreating the American Dream nationally and rebuilding 
America's reputation abroad. In the Presidential election of 2008, it became 
readily apparent that former President George Bush was unpopu lar, both 
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among Americans and Europeans. This was highlighted by domestic polls 
in the U.S. showing that Americans had limited faith in President Bush 
and his ability to lead the country in a positive direction .1 The growing 
domestic concerns with the Bush administration's policies also manifested 
themselves in a European context, with growing tensions between major 
European leaders and President Bush as well as through demonstrations in 
major European cities against the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East. 
lt was equally apparent that President Obama would be greeted with ex-
pectations ofrestoring the transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Eu-
rope. Less obvious are the differing ways the U.S. and Europe define those 
relations-differences that will pose challenges to both sides. This article 
seeks to explore the ongoing debate on transatlantic relations, first by iden-
tifying two differing and sometimes conflicting perspectives-one based on 
transatlantic conflict, the other on cooperation-and then by outlining five 
larger challenges within these relations that are crucial to the future of the 
transatlantic relations. The fundamental question is whether those relations 
can realistically improve with the election of President Obama or whether 
the growing tensions under the Bush administration illustrated fundamental 
differences within the transatlantic relationship. Although political scien-
tists di sagree on this point and President Obama's stance in foreign policy 
questions has yet to crystallize, Obama 's faith in a restored transatlantic 
alliance and Europe's response to the new Presidency suggest that the Bush 
era was a temporary distraction from the fostering of a long-standing and 
developing alliance. 
Foreign Policy Determinants 
The study of foreign policy, established in the World War II era, belongs in 
the larger area of international relations ("IR").2 Foreign policy analys is has 
traditionally focused on governmental institutions' performances in formu-
lating and implementing foreign policy issues. The assumption within IR 
theory has been that foreign policy analysis is more important than other 
policy areas . Foreign policy analysis concerns national interest rather than 
I Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll. December 6-8, 2008. 
2 Carlsnaes, Walter 2005. "Foreign Policy." In Walte r Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons (eds.) 
Handbook of lntematio11a/ Relations. London, Th0t1sand Oaks & New Dehli: SAGE Publications. 
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special interest, and foreign policy making is about protecting fundamental 
values of each state. "This has given foreign policy a very powerful image 
in the study of International Relations."3 
Foreign policies may be defined as " ... those actions which , expressed 
in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and 
pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sover-
e ign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors-
both governme ntal and non-governmental-which they want to affect and 
which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy."4 A core concern has been how 
to explain fore ign policy making. The dominating approach to foreign poli-
cy analysis has focused on the nature of the international system and its im-
pact on foreign policy making. Although the realists are not a homogenous 
group of researche rs (read classical , neo-, structural , offensive, defensive 
realism) , they have certain commonalities . First, it has been argued that for-
eign policy making appears in an anarchic setting , and, secondly, that each 
state strives for power (as capabilities) to pursue security. Third and finally, 
states are the core actors to analyze and should be treated as uni tary ac-
tors that face international challenges .5 However, research on foreign policy 
making has also encompassed the state level. This approach questions the 
assumption that international factors determine foreign policy making. The 
approach also stresses that the single state should not be treated as a 'black 
box.' Research on domestic factors has rather focused on political leaders 
and/or the agencies and branches that structure foreign policy making. For-
eign policy making, it is argued, is a result of state leaders' and branches' 
interpretations of international relations.6 The cognitive and psychological 
approaches have primarily analyzed the way individual decision-makers 
may process important information based on their underlying beliefs, per-
3 Webber, Mark & Michael Smith 2002: 11. Foreig11 Policy i11 a Tra11sfor111ed World. Essex: Pearson Educa-
tion Limited. 
4 Carlsnaes, Walter 2005: 335. "Foreign Policy." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons 
(eds.) Handbook of /111erna1io11al l?e/atio11.v. London, Thousand Oaks & New Dehli: SAGE Publications. 
5 For detailed comparison, see Morgenthau, Hans 1967. Politics Among Nations: '/11e Struggle for Power 
and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Aron, Raymond 1966. Peace a11d War: A Theory of J11tematio11a/ 
Rela1io11.1". Garden City: Doubleday; Gilpin, Robert 1981. H~1r and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theo1y of lntematinnal Politics. Reading: Addison-
Wesley. 
6 Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield & Tim Dunne 2008. Foreig11 Pa/icy- Theories, Actors and Cases. Oxford: 
Oxford Universi ty Press. 
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sonality traits, motivations, ideological belongings, and attitudes.7 How-
ever, leaders and groups operate within a domestic, institutional setting that 
frames the decision-making process with constraints and opportunities. The 
foreign policy process may therefore be seen as a process influenced by 
individual and group interests within the state framework of politi cal and 
bureaucratic branches and their standard operating procedures.8 
A New U.S . Presidential Administration 
The type of leader elected and his or her cabinet will have an impact on for-
eign policy making and international relations. The U.S . Presidential elec-
tion of November, 2008, was therefore of great interest in foreign policy 
analysis. The Presidential campaign was greatly influenced by the notion 
of two different types of leaders , with different perceptions on the nature of 
international relations and approaches to U.S . foreign policy making. 
A few weeks prior to the November 4 election, opinion polls consistently 
showed how Democratic candidate Obama was favored over Republican 
candidate John McCain. Obama was perceived as being able to deliver a 
clear plan to solve the nation's problems and to bring the kind of change 
the country needed.9 There were several factors behind Obama's success-
ful candidacy. First and foremost, Obama's call for change was perceived 
with more urgency against the backdrop of the nation's deepening financial 
crisis. Obama was the first candidate to present a financial plan to combat 
ris ing unemployment, loss of healthcare, and housing foreclosures.10 Mc-
Cain , never viewed as a skilled economist even among his own ranks, was 
portrayed as just another Republican who would lead the economy down 
the same path as his predecessor. President Bush's eight years in charge 
were marked by national debts and deficits, especially compared to the 
7 Axelrod, Robe1  (ed.) 1976. Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elite.I". Princeton: 
Princeton Uni vers ity Press; Jervis, Robert 1976. Perception and Misperception i11 lnternatio11al Politics . 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Larson , Deborah W. J 997. Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.·Soviet Rela-
tions during the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
8 Hermann , Margaret G. 1993. "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." In Dan Caldwell & Tornothy 
McKeown (eds.) Diplomacy, Force, and Leaders/1ip: Es.my.< in Honor of Alexander Georxe . Boulder: 
Westview; Janis, Trving J. 1982. Gro11pthi11k: Psychological Studies of Policy Decfaio 11 s and Fiascoes. 
Boston: Houghton Miffl in . 
9 CNN/Opinion research Corporation poll . October 17- 19 , 2008. 
10 See Newsweek Poll conducted by P1inceton Survey research Associates International. October 22-23, 
2008. Similar figu res are presented by ABC News/Washington Post Poll. October 8- 11, 2008. 
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heaJthy economy and budget surplus left by the nation 's previous President, 
Democrat Bill Cl inton .II The American voter, on its part, viewed a McCain 
administration as an extension of the Bush era. 12 Secondly, Obama argued 
that American society had become increasingly callous and cold under 
the previous administration. His proposed cure had two main prongs: All 
Americans should have the right to ed ucation and the right to free health-
care. On the question of whether Obama or McCain would do a better job 
handling health care issues, 58% to 30% answered Obama.13 A third factor 
in Obama's victory was his ability to dominate McCain in the media. The 
fierce and protracted Democratic primaries against then-Senator Clinton 
had forced Obama to fine-tune his arguments and analyze the mood of the 
electorate. The drawn-out process also gave Obama increased media expo-
sure. Obama's message of change created a massive grassroots movement 
that reached new voters in new geographical areas. The presidential cam-
paign transformed the Illinois Senator to a political super-star; crowds in 
excess of 100,000 often flocked to hear his campaign trai l speeches. 
Obama's Foreign Policy Promises 
However, while the presidential campaign was defi ned by national issues 
such as the economy, Obama succeeded in presenting a foreign policy 
framework that appealed to many Americans. Obama 's vocal opposition 
to the Iraq War and his promise to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq within 
sixteen months were popular among war-weary voters.14 When debating 
the issue of the Iraq War, Obama repeatedly focused on the strategic mis-
take and logical anomaly of conducting a war in Iraq when all evidence 
suggested that the roots of terrorism against the U .S. were dug into the 
hills of Afghanistan. Is Obama's message was supported by the bipartisan 
report produced by The Iraq Study Group (ISG) , which was organized on 
March 15, 2006, at Capitol Hill , Washington, D .C. The group consisted 
I I USA Today/Gallup Poll. October 10-12, 2008; Newsweek Poll conducted hy Princeton Survey Research 
Associates Jnternational. October 8-9. 2008. 
12 USA Today/Gallup Poll. October JO-12, 2008. 
13 Newsweek poll conducted by Princclon Survey Research Associates international. October 22-23, 2008. 
See also CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll. October 17-1 9, 2008 or ABC News/Washington Posl 
Poll. O~tober 8-1 1, 2008 . 
14 CBS News/New York Times Poll. October 25-29, 2008. 
15 CNN Presidential debate , September 26, 2008, Univers ity of Mississippi. 
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of members of the U.S. Congress and was created to assess the situation 
in Iraq since the summer of 2005; its fi nal report was issued on December 
6, 2006. The report stressed that "[o]ur most important recommendations 
call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the 
regi~n , and a change in the p1imary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that wi 11 
enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
responsibly." 16 
A promise to end the unpopular Iraq War came as a relief to many Ameri-
cans, who for five years had witnessed a steady rise in American casu-
alties (more than 4 ,200 dead by the time of the election) .17 The national 
fi nancial crisis also brought domestic social and economic issues to the 
forefront. Since its inception in 2003, the Iraq War has averaged $10 billion 
per month, resulting in a cumulatively mind-boggl ing expense to the same 
taxpayers who were now caught in the eye of the perfect financial storm. 18 
Obama also argued that the U.S. would treat future foreign crises with 
increased patience by not abandoning diplomacy until all peaceful mea-
sures had been explored and had failed. War would be the last solution, he 
and Secretary of State Clinton asserted-another lesson from Iraq. Obama, 
however, has stressed the potential need of using American troops for pur-
poses of humanitarian intervention. Obama argued in favor of a continued 
strong commitment to freedom, democracy, and human rights as being part 
of a great American history. As stated in the acceptance speech in Grant 
Park, Chicago, on election eve: 
And to all those watching tonight from beyond our shores, from parliaments and palaces , 
to those who arc huddled around radios in the forgotten corners of the world , our sto1ies 
are singular, but our destiny is shared , and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand. 
To those-to those who would tear the world down: We will defeat you. To those who 
seek peace and security: We support you. And to all those who have wondered if Amer-
ica 's beacon still burns as bright: Tonight we proved once more that the true strength of 
our nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth , but from 
the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope.19 
16 Baker, James A. & Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairs) 2006. The lraq Study Group Rcpott. See hllp://www.usip. 
org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/reporl/1206/index.html (April 27, 2009). 
17 See http://www.globalsccurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm (April 27, 2009). 
18 Barack Obama rally in Gc l'mantown, Philadelphia, October 2008. 
J 9 See hllp://cdition.cnn.com/2008/l'OLITJCS/11 /04/obarna .transcripl/ (April 27, 2009). 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 31 
Transatlantic Relations? 
Obarna's approach in fore ign policies clearly marked an Ameri can ambi-
tion to promote American norms and values abroad. But to do so, Obama 
argued for improved relations with former allies in Europe. The importance 
of repairing America's reputation abroad and re-building coalitions with 
former allies were main themes in candidate Obama 's presidential cam-
paign. Obama's charisma also translated into Europe; his speech in Ber-
lin in the summer of 2008, "A World That Stands as One," attracted over 
200,000 people.20 It raised the question of what challenges Obama's United 
States will face in its transatlantic relations with Europe. While the re la-
tionship has been debated, especially s ince the end of the Cold War, the 
debate intensified during the Bush Presidency from 2000 lo 2008. Over 
those eight years, the U.S. and Europe have butted heads on security issues 
(regarding Afghanistan , Iran, Iraq, and North Korea), environmental issues 
including global warming (the Kyoto Treaty), international trade within the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) , and human rights protection (Guanta-
namo Bay).21 As a consequence, there has been a growing bulk of studies 
on transatlantic relations .22 Although these studies have naturally different 
focuses based on addressing different aspects of security as well as differ-
ent actors within the transatlantic relations, two broad perspectives on the 
transatlantic relationship on security emerge- one based on conflict , the 
other on cooperation. As studies on the transatlantic relationship more or 
less agree that the Bush era caused a deeper rift between the U.S. and Eu-
rope, the two perspectives represent scholarly views on how deep thi s rift 
may be . The cooperation perspective argues that the Bush factor temporar-
ily challenged the alliance, which will gradually improve as the memory 
of the outgoing U.S. administration fades. The conflict perspective points 
out that the Bush factor was not the sole cause of frustrating transatlantic 
relations. 
20 http://my.barackobama.com/page/conununity/post/obamaruadblog/gGxyd4 (April 27, 2009). 
2 1 Biscop, Sven & Johan Lembke (eds.). 2008. EU Enlargemellf and the tramat/a111ic al/iauce: a security re-
/atitmsilip i11j/11x. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.; Schmidt, Peter (ed.) 2008. A hybrid relatio11silip: rra11satlamic 
security cooperation beyond N/\TO. Frankfurt am Main: Perer Lang. 
22 Dunn, David Hastings 2009. "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage: Transatlantic Relations after 
Bush," The British Journal of Politics and /11remario11a/ Relnrio11s 11, 4-24. 
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The Consensus Perspective 
The solid historical alliance between Europe and the U.S. as a Western 
collective project co nstitutes the basis for the consensus perspective.23 So 
far, the project has not been articulated or extensively coordinated , but it 
has contained certain implicit agreements on how to organize politics into 
a liberal order of democracy and market economy. From this perspective, 
the transatlantic alliance was envisioned in Wilson's 14 points and began 
with the collective security in the League of Nations. It was developed with 
the defeat of Nazism and Fascism in the 1940s and firmly institutionalized 
with the ideas of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill who in 
the Atlantic Charter (1941) advocated "the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live."24 The Truman Doctrine 
further presented democratic principles as a strategy against Communist 
expansion. These principles were institutionalized in the 1949 North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the U.S. and Western European 
states committing to "safeguard the freedom founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."25 The Marshall Plan 
provided U.S. economic aid to Western European states, which further tied 
those states to the transatlantic ally. The emerging threat of Communism in 
the Cold War added glue to the transatlantic alliance. 
The end of the Cold War and the vanishing Communist threat initially posed 
a challenge to the necessity and survival of the alliance, but the alUes gradually 
recognized that their belief in the supeiiority of the alliance's embedded norms 
and values would apply to future challenges in a globalizecl era. The new era 
gave rise to a more institutionalized and constructive discussion on how to uti-
lize and spread Western norms and values, and led to the expansion of the EU 
and NATO. Both organizations saw not only a growing number of member-
states, but also an expanded mandate to operate within and beyond European 
borders. Therefore, the post-Cold War era did not mean an end to the transat-
23 Smith, Karen Elisabeth 2003 . European U11ion Policy i11 a Cha11gi11g World. Cambridge: Polity Press; 
Jones, Erik. "Debating the transatlantic relationship: rhetoric and reality," l111em atio11al Affa irs. 2004, 80: 
4,595-6 12. 
24 Whitehead, Laurence 1986: 5. "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O ' Donnell, 
Philippe C . Schmillcr & Laurence Whitehead (eds.). Tram itio11sfro111 A111horitaria11 Rule: Comparative 
Perspectives. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
25 Whitehead , Laurence 1986: 5. " lntcmational Aspects of Democratizat ion ," in Gui llermo O ' Donnell , 
Philippe C . Schmjtte r & Laurence Whitehead (eds .). 7i'a11si1io11s ji·o111 A111lwriwria11 Rule: Co111paratil'e 
Perspective.1·. Baltimore & J .ondon: The Johns Hopkins Un iversity Press . 
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!antic relationship , but forced it to redefine itself to face new challenges.26 The 
post-Cold War order brought with it the break-up of states, the proliferation 
of arms, the reorganization of international criminality, and the escalation of 
religious and ethnic conflicts. These chaHenges required strengthened transat-
lantic political and economic ties,27 as well as cultural ties.28 
Despite major changes in the political landscape from the late 1980s, the 
transatlantic alliance has remained intact. ln fact, the 1990s was a golden 
decade for the alliance- the transatlantic declaration of 1990 and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 were two pi votal points to illustrate this. New 
policies on economic liberalization and democracy, and the annual U.S .-EU 
summit, were also showing the rest of the world that the transatlantic alli- . 
ance remained active as more and more global issues surfaced on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Today, the two sides are working together in Afghanistan , 
Kosovo, and Lebanon, and they agree on diplomatic talks with Tran and 
Syria as well as on the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The shared notion of grow-
ing independence between the two will most likely lead to a strengthened 
alli ance in the 21" century.29 Regarding the last years of tension in the trans-
atlantic relationships, the opinions among most Europeans have been that 
the Bush administration is the one to be blamed and not the U.S. as a state.30 
The Conflict Perspective 
Conversely, the conflict perspective foresees a growing transatlantic rift .31 
This perspective maintains that there are deep differences between the U.S . 
and Europe which were previously concealed by the shadow of the Cold 
War and the Tron Curtain. The collapse of the common Communist enemy 
gave rise to disagreements-without a common enemy, there was no reason 
26 Duke. Simon 2004. "Foreword: Time for a New Transatlantic Bargain?" in Charlotte Wallin & Daniel 
Silandcr (eds.). Democracy and C11/111re i111/te Tra11sarla111ic World. Vaxjo: Viixjo University Press. 
27 Fukuyama, Francis 1992. Tlte Em/ of History and rite Ltw Mou. New York: Penguin. 
28 I luntington, Samuel P. 1996. Tlte C/aslt of Civilizations w1d tlte Remaking of World Order. New York, 
Simon & Schuster. 
29 Peterson, John & Rebecca Steffenson 2008 . "Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered," 
T/1e Britislt .loum al of Politics aud !111ematio11a/ Relatio11s JI : 25-45. 
30 Pew Global Altitudes Project 2003. Views of a C/1011gi11g World .l1111e 2003. Washi ngton, D.C.: Pew Re-
search Center for the People and the Press. 
3 1 Granieri, Ronald J . 2006. "Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American ' Empire by 
Invitation"' in Orbis 50:4, 691-707; Danchev Alex 2005. " How Strong are Shared Values in the Transat-
lantic Relationship?" Tile British Journal of Politic.1· and /111ematio11al Relatio11s 7:3, 429-436 . 
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left for cooperation until a new enemy could be identified.32 The transatlan-
tic alliance during the Cold War was an unhappy marriage, meaning that 
Europe and the U.S. were in a relationship , but without any deeper com-
mitment or loyalty.33 Before World War II, the U.S. and Europe had little 
in common. In fact, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, in the late 181" 
century, was the result of a struggle to get away from Europe and the Eu-
ropean heritage. Politically and culturally the U.S . developed in reaction to 
the other side of the Atlantic and saw its freedom and prosperity challenged 
by European forces. World War II symbolized, from a U.S. perspective , the 
ongoing threats Europe imposed on the U.S., either directly or as a result of 
the U.S. having to strengthen its military to guard against foreign threats.34 
However, the U.S . needed Western Europe as a trading partner and as a buf-
fet zone against Communism, while Europe was in need of U.S . protection 
and economic aid.35 In a time of a rising Cold War, potential differences in 
economic, political , and cultural interests were set aside due to the geopo-
litical battle between the two superpowers . 
The end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical situation at its core. It 
led to the collapse of the main enemy in the Soviet Union and paved way 
for the failed states syndrome in Eastern Europe, which included the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Balkan crisis of the early 
1990s showed the weaknesses of Europe in being unable to deal with Eu-
ropean crises without U.S . involvement. This lack of capacity caused the 
U.S. administration, and foremost the Bush administration , to act unilater-
ally based on the perception of Europe as a weak partner and no longer an 
important geostrategic player.36 The differences in power between Europe 
and the U.S. also led to differences in perceptions of security challenges . 
This dilemma was illustrated by the Iraq War. The U.S.-led invasion oflraq 
in 2003 was supported by only six out of the fifteen EU member-states then 
32 Lundestad, Gcir 2005 . E<W, West, North, South-Maior Developments i11 lntematio11al /?elations Since 
1945. London, Thousand Oaks & New Dehli: SAGE Publications; Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash 
<~f Civi/izatiom and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster Ltd. 
33 Howard , Michael. 1999. "NATO at fi fty: An unhappy s uccessful marriage: Security means knowing what 
to expect," Foreign Affairs 78:3, 151 -1 60. 
34 Kagan, Robert 2003 . Of Paradise and Power- America and Eumpe in the New World Order. New York: 
Random House. 
35 Murphy, Alexander B. 2006. 'T he Changing Face of US-Europe Relations: Geopolitical Causes and Pos-
sible Consequences," GeoJoumai 66:285-293. 
36 Murphy, Alexander B. 2006. "T he Changing Face of US-Europe Relations: Geopolitical Causes and Pos-
sible Consequences," Geo.lo11mal 66:285-293. 
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in ex istence, triggering a debate on the weakened transatlantic relationship. 
First, the invasion divided the EU, as major European powers such as France 
and Germany were against the war, while Poland, Italy, and Spain remained 
the closest U.S. allies (although Spain eventually withdrew their troops) .37 
Second, the invasion also divided the international community within the 
United Nations, leaving the UN Security Council in internal conflict. Per-
manent members France, the U.S., and the United Kingdom had different 
stands on how to invade and why, which with France's ability to veto led to 
a paralyzed Security Council.38 The reason for these diverging perceptions 
on Iraq has historical roots. The post-World War II era consisted of a Euro-
pean military dependency on the U.S. The EUJopeans learned to accept that 
their security was determined by the U.S. nuclear umbrella within NATO. 
This strategic dependency was so accepted that the U.S. military presence 
in European politics led to an unwillingness among Europeans to spend tax 
money on defence. The new vision among Europeans was to build a con-
stitutional order of democracies and market economies in which military 
capability was not prioritized or even desired .39 As argued by Kagan: "It 
is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common 
view of the world , or even that they occupy the same world. On all-impor-
tant questions of power- the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the 
desirability of power- American and European perspectives arc diverging . 
. . . They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this 
state of affairs is not transitory-the product of one American e lection or 
one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, 
long in development, and likely to endure."40 
The two perspectives offer complementary understandings of the trans-
atlantic relationships over time. The categorization of the transatlantic rela-
tions into two perspectives is a simplification of the many aspects of rela-
tions involved in the research on transatlantic re lations and must be read as 
37 Murphy, Alexander 13. 2006. "The Changing Face of US-Europe Relations: Geopolitical Causes and Pos-
sible Consequences," Geolo11mal 66:285-293. 
38 Kavacs, Charles 2003. "US-European Relations from the l\ventieth to the 'J\venty-first Century," E11ropea11 
Foreig11 Affairs Review 8:4, 435-456; Ncchold, Hansdspeter 2003. 'T ransatlantic Turbulences: Rift or Rip-
pies?", European Foreig11 Affairs Review 8:4, 457-469. 
39 Kagan, Robert 2003. Of Paradi.ve and l'ower-America n11d J::umpe in t!te New World Order . New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
40 Kagan, Robert 2003:3-4. Of Paradise and Power- America and Europe in t!te New World Order. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
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explanatory generalizations. However, although the perspectives presented 
herein host a large number of scholars with different views, those views 
are similar when it comes to the nature of the transatlantic relations and 
provide the reader with a better understanding of the debate on transatlantic 
relations in a context of the new U.S. president. However, most scholars 
have come to adhere to the consensus perspective, acknowledging a long-
term transatlantic alliance. It has been argued that the Bush administration 
became a major challenge to the alliance and that a new U.S. president will 
energize the alliance to meet new international challenges . 
Contemporary Challenges 
The 2008 presidential election was closely monitored by European lead-
ers. There are today high hopes in Europe (and in the U.S.) that President 
Obama is the leader to improve the transatlantic alliance. However, there 
are obstacles to overcome-challenges that concern different aspects of se-
curity relations and that have to be taken into consideration by the Obama 
administration to further improve the transatlantic relations. This article 
identifies the fi ve major challenges as European Leadership, the notion of 
Justified Intervention , the War on Terrorism, Democracy Promotion , and 
the use of Hard vs . Soft Power. 
European Leadership 
The first foreign policy challenge is caused by Europe's divided leadership, 
a fact that became uncomfortably obvious to all parties during the divi-
sive build-up to the Iraq War. Over thirty years ago, then-Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger rhetorically asked for the phone number to Europe . Even 
today, when most European states are part of an EU with open borders and 
a partly centralized governance, Europe does not have a natural counterpart 
to an American President or Secretary of State. While the EU is a platform 
for a European voice , or at least for the Union 's member-states, a proposal 
in the Lisbon Treaty to create an EU Secretary of State was never ratified. If 
President Obama wants direct discussions with the EU, he has several calls 
to make: to the twenty-seven secretaries of state of EU's member-states , 
the rotating chairman of the Council of Ministries, the Chairman of the 
Commission General Directorate of External Relations , and the EU High 
Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Issues . For Europe 
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and the U.S. to succeed in overcoming differences and re-establishing a 
strong alliance, the means of direct communications must improve-within 
Europe as well as between the EU and the U.S. 
Justified Intervention 
A second fore ign policy challenge is the differing views on what justifies, or 
even compels, intervention by international forces in an independent state. 
The issue has surfaced in the crises in Afghanistan , Bosnia , Haiti , Kosovo, 
Iraq , Rwanda , and Somalia. A nation 's military intervention in another state 
is generally considered an act of war. Dut the intervention of a coalition of 
multilateral nations has at times been justified by the inte rnational commu-
nity as a necessary and justifiable defense of higher, universal values. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the EU have grappled with the issue 
of whether and when to militarily intervene in a foreign conflict. Here, the 
U.S. and the EU differ dramatically. Many European states, including the 
Scandinavian states, have a strong faith in the role of the United Nations. 
This is because the UN is a substitute for the power that many of the Euro-
pean states lack, as small states with limited military budgets. This school 
of thought argues that only the UN Security Council can sanction interven-
tion , an argument that is largely rejected in the U.S. The Europeans are 
more determined to find multilateral solutions to global challenges. They 
see the Americans as, at times, misusing their superior military power by 
acting unilaterally in global crises . The negative opinions within the U.S. 
Congress during the Bush ad ministration to multilateral talks on the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Land Mines Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the 
UN talks on Iraq, North Korea, and Iran made many European state leaders 
view U.S. unilateralism as anogance.41 
From an American foreign-policy perspective, intervention is primarily 
guided by national security interests. If American security interests are jeop-
ardized, be it directly or indirectly, military intervention may be justified. A 
mandate from the UN Security Council would be helpful and appreciated, 
but intervention can also be based solely on alliances and the consent of 
other states than those represented by the Council. The U .S . argument has 
been that the Council is represented by undemocratic states - Russia and 
41 Nye, Joseph S. 2004: 64-67. Soft Power- Tile Means to Success i11 World Politics. New York: Public Af-
fairs. 
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China-that have a hi story of pursuing national security interests which 
often conflict with those of the U.S. Seeking a UN mandate is therefore not 
always strategically possible or desired.42 
The War on Terrorism 
A third challenge is the differing views on terrorism. Europeans were horri-
fied by the attacks on September 11, 2001 against the U.S. and were quick 
to come to the Americans' defense . The headline of French daily Le Monde 
read: "We are all Americans now."43 Gerhard Schrneder, then-Chancellor 
of Germany, expressed his unlimited solidarity with the U.S. , at the same 
time that NATO declared that the terrorist attack was a violation of Article 
5, which states that an attack against one NATO member is an attack on 
every mernber.44 Eight years later, Europe is collectively relieved to see a 
change of U .S. administrations. President Bush's war on terrorism created 
tensions between the European states that supported the Iraq war and those 
who refused to send troops. The U.S. invasion of Iraq also raised concerns 
over America's judgment and/or true intentions. If the U.S., contrary to 
evidence, found a link between Iraq and the terror of September 11, Euro-
peans feared that the war on terrorism could be used to justify just about 
any attack , thereby creating an endless string of unilateral interventions. 
The wars could be conducted against dissident states, political groups seek-
ing recognition or self-governance, or even against American or European 
citizens with unusual religious beliefs or surnames. Many Europeans also 
questioned the wisdom of conducting a global war on tetTOrism. Europe has 
fought terrorism nationally for decades, without feeling a need to declare 
a global war. Terrorism must be combated, it was agreed , but many EU 
member-states could not envision that terrorism could threaten the Western 
world order and were therefore not willing to escalate the war globally.45 As 
stated by Rees Wyn, "Differing transatlantic threat perceptions have been 
42 Murphy, Alexander B. 2006. "The Changing Face of US-Europe Relations: Geopolitical Causes and Pos-
sible Consequences," CeoJ011mal 66:285-293. 
43 In Colombani, J-M. (2001). "We Arc all Americans." Le Monde, September 12, 2001. 
44 Dunn, Hastings David 2009. "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage: Transatlantic Relations after 
Bush," Tile /Jritixh Joumal of Politics and /111emario11a/ Relations, 11: 4-24. 
45 Wyn. Rees 2008. "Securing the Homelands: Transatlantic Co-ope111tion after Bush," The British Joumal of 
Politics and lntemational Relations 11, I 08-121; Shapirn J. & D. By mun 2006. "Bridging the transatlantic 
counterterrorism gap," The WM'1ingto11 Quarrerly, 29:4, 33-50. 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 39 
moulded by historical experiences. While European governments have ex-
perienced mainly nationalist terrorist movements, the US has suffered from 
terrorism as a foreign policy phenomenon."46 
Democracy Promotion 
A fourth foreign policy challenge is the differing views on how democracy 
should be promoted internationally. There is long-term transatlantic consen-
sus on the many benefits that come with democratization. The transatlantic 
alliance grew out of the danger of nondemocratic regimes. The Western 
notion of democracy as a universal norm is based on the democratic peace 
theory which stresses that democracies are peace-prone in their relations 
toward other democracies. The primary benefit is the indi vidual freedom 
that democracy provides. A second benefit concerns security. Some schol-
ars argue that democratic governance provides states with domestic checks 
and balances that make war more difficult to launch .47 The third benefit is 
economically motivated: by providing democracy abroad, one may get ac-
cess to new markets and potential economic partners.48 
The U.S. and Europe have been allies in promoting democracy. In 2005 , 
President Bush argued for democracy promotion as a prioritized goal dur-
ing his second term. The EU Commjssion president, Jose Manuel Barroso, 
welcomed this American priority by stressing, at his visit to the White 
House in October, 2005, that both sides "share the idea that our strategic 
partnership should serve to promote democracy ... "49 However, questions 
remain on how to promote thi s norm.50 After all , the post-Cold War order 
did not become an order of democratic peace . Although many old threats 
have disappeared , new perceived threats such as civil wars, secession, re-
ligious tensions, and terrorism pose new challenges to the Western liberal 
order, fue lling the transatlantic debate on democracy promotion. There are 
46 Wyn, Rees 2008. "Securing the Homelands: Transatlantic Co-operation after Bush," '/lie British .Touma/ of 
Politics w1d l111emational Relations 11, 108-121. 
47 Diamond. L,rry. "Promoting Democracy", Foreign Policy 92:87, 27-28. 
48 Herring. Eric 1994. "International security and democratisation in Eastern Europe." in Geoffrey Pridham, 
Eric Herring & George Sanford (eds.), Building Democracy? The /111emarional Di111e11sio11 of Democrati· 
:atio11 in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Marlin's Press. 
49 ln Kopstein, Jeffrey 2006. "The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion," Washi11gto11 Quarterly, 
29:2, 85-98. 
50 McFaul , Michael 2004. "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," Washington Quarterly, 28: I, 147-148. 
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a few obvious differences between the two in their approach to democracy 
promotion. First, Europe has cri ticized the U.S. for using democracy-pro-
motion as camouflage for the furtherance of unilateral secmity and eco-
nomic interests. Other criticism targets the U.S. use of military force to 
liberate people , the criticism focusing on the dubious strategic effectiveness 
of forcing states into becoming democracies and the moral justification of 
using military or economic force to demand democratic compliance. Sec-
ond, more specific disagreements have concerned what type of democracy 
should be promoted - presidential or parliamentary systems, federal or uni -
tary states - and the duration of the external commitment. Traditionally, 
the U.S . has focused on strong, pro-Western leadership , while the EU has 
been concerned over the sustainability of democracy.51 The two approaches 
could be complementary, but in practice have proved problematic when 
the U.S. and the EU have been simultaneously involved in, for example, 
Kosovo, Turkey, Serbia, and Ukraine. Third , there are also differences in 
how to channel democracy into a domestic context. The U.S . approach has 
been bottom-up, focusing on the civil society as the prodemocratic forces 
in authoritarian states. This strategy has been based on the U.S. notion that 
people long for freedom and if only international assistance to the c ivil 
society comes through , people on the streets will demand a new leadership 
based on free and fair elections. The European side, on the other hand, has 
other experiences from the rejection of Communism in Eastern Europe. 
The EU strategy in this region was democratic a id from top down , target-
ing the elites in the Communist systems to change the political views or to 
support the already existing pro-Western opposing elites to the Communist 
regimes.52 OveraJI , there seems to be a long-term consensus over the im-
portance of democracy promotion; the conflict concerns how to promote 
democracy and when. 
51 Kops1ein, Jeffrey 2006. "The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion," Wa.1"hi11gto11 Quarterly 
29:2, 85-99; Pridham, Geoffrey 2007. "Change and Continuity in lhc European Union's Political Condi-
tionality: Aims, Approach and Priorities,'' Democratization 14:3, 446-471; McFaul, Michael 2004. "De-
mocracy Promotion as a World Value," Wa.v/1i11gto11 Quarterly 28 .: 1, 157- 159. 
52 Kopste in , Jeffrey 2006. "The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion ," The Was/1i11gto11 
Quarterly , 29:2, 85-98. 
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Hard vs. Soft Power 
A fifth foreign policy challenge is the difference in how the U.S. and Eu-
rope view the current world order. Europe tends to view the world in a more 
positive and peaceful light than the U.S., which is partly based on Europe's 
successful quest to develop a union that has transformed traditional enemy 
states into staunch allies-a goal that took nearly half a century to fulfil. 
The creation of the borderless EU has fostered a faith in institutionalized 
coexistence and cooperation- a democratic and peaceful world order. From 
an American perspective , the European order is attractive but idealistic in a 
time of globalization and external threats to nation states from cross-border 
terrorism and financial criminality. The European order is viewed as the re- . 
sult of a supportive American hegemony that for decades protected Europe 
from external threats that otherwise would have destroyed the European 
paradise. American political scientist Robert Kagan has theorized that these 
differing perspectives concerning the world order are directly related to 
each actor's foreign relations capacity. A powerful nation, Kagan reasons, 
is more willing and able to use its power and more likely to legitimize the 
use of it. If you have military capabilities, you tend to develop threat images 
that make military use necessary.53 As argued , " [w]hen you have a hammer, 
all problems start to look like nails .... When you don ' t have a hammer, you 
don ' t want anything to look like a nail."54 
The U.S. is a "hard and soft power."55 However, from a European per-
spective , the U.S. has foremost played the role as the hard power in in-
ternational relations. The declarntions on "Rogue states" and "the Axis of 
Evils" under the Bush administration were perceived by Europeans as a 
symbol of more military power and less diplomacy. Many Europeans were 
convinced that ongoing negotiations with Iraq would have led to fruitful 
discussions. However, there are reasons for EU 's stand on Iraq. Europe is 
comparatively speaking a military midget, with a military capacity stifled 
by two world wars. The resulting military dependence on the U.S. dur-
ing the Cold War caused the European states to further limit their military 
spending . Having marginalized its military capacity, Europe developed into 
53 Kagan, Robert 2003. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in tire New World Order. New York: 
Random House. 
54 Kagan , Robe1  2003:27-28. Of Paradise and Power- America a11d Europe in the New World Order. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf'. 
55 Nye , Joseph S. 2004 . Soft Power- the Means to Success in World Polilics. New York: Public Affairs. 
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a soft power that utilized other methods (competitive or complementary) to 
assert their influence in world politics.56 Today, the EU is a normative, civil-
ian, soft power due to its constitutional nature of institutions, norms, and 
values.57 As a soft power, the EU primarily conducts its foreign policy via 
trade, foreign aid , humanitarian efforts , and the promotion of democracy.58 
The development of the EU into a soft power, in contrast with the U.S. 
approach , has intensified the debate on transatlantic relations and on how 
the U.S. and Europe can shape their future in which both hru·d and soft 
power will be needed. 
Conclusion 
Europe and the U.S. face a diffi cult task in improving the transatlantic alli-
ance. Five clearly defined challenges must be overcome. The fifty-year suc-
cess story that was triggered by the Marshall plan, the Truman Doctrine, and 
the institutionalization of a military alliance has been put on hold by eight 
years of Bush-era politics. The near future will show whether the blame for 
the eroding transatlantic relations can be put squarely on the shoulders of 
the Bush administration, or if Europe and the U.S. have simply outgrown 
each other. Political scientists disagree on this point. President Obama's 
stance on foreign policy questions has yet to crystallize, but signs indicate 
that Obama himself has faith in a restored transatlantic alliance. During the 
presidential campaign , Obama repeatedly reminded the electorate that the 
Bush administration had misled the American people into an ill-conceived 
war in Iraq, by falsely claiming that Iraq was the root of international ter-
roiism and nuclear proliferation. The Iraq War resulted in conflicts with 
several European states that voiced their dismay both on the political stage 
and through numerous demonstrations. The election of Obama was wanted 
among most Europeans. 
It is therefore likely that the transatlantic relations will gradually im-
prove as the memory of the outgoing administration fades and the new ad-
ministration conducts its new foreign policies. The "Bush factor" was most 
likely the sole cause of frustrating transatlantic relations. This could be seen 
by the way Obama has come to approach many of the identified challenges 
56 Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2004: x. Soft Power- The Means 10 Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 
57 Maull , Hanns W. 2005. "Europe and the new balance of global order," lmem(//io11a/ Affairs 8 1 :4, 775-799. 
58 Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Sufi Pmvor - 1/ie Means 10 Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs . 
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by reaching out to Europe. Tbe new U.S. President has, in bis first steps as 
president, showed a willingness to rebuild trust in the transatlanti c alli ance , 
based on the notion of mutual dependency and shared norms and values . As 
stated in Berlin in the summer of 2008 , "Yes, there have been differences 
between America and Europe. No doubt, there will be differences in the 
future. But the burdens of global citizenship continue to bind us together. 
A change of leadership in Washington will not lift this burden. In this new 
century, Americans and Europeans alike will be required to do more-not 
less. Partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice; it is the one 
way, the only way, to protect our corrnnon security and advance our com-
mon humanity .... America has no better partner than Europe."59 
It is still too early to tell if Obama will fulfill his promise of multilateral 
cooperation with Europe. However, his first few months in office have in-
dicated that it is a new U.S. foreign policy under development-one that 
differs from the Bush administration. Obama has declared the intention to 
withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq , vowed to close down the foreign combat-
ant detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, promised to be a leader on global 
warming and sustainable development, and insisted to stick to diplomacy 
in international relations. This is what most European leaders have waited 
for. The extent to which the U.S. will co-operate with Europe is, however, 
li kely to depend on how both sides of the Atlantic deal with the five iden-
ti fied challenges. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. under Obama's 
leadership succeeds in reaching out to Europe in a multilateral arrangement 
by treating Europe as equal in international relations, and if Europe has the 
willingness and ability to speak with one voice. 
59 See http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLTTICS/07124/obama.words/ (April 29, 2009). 

